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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Legislature was not in session during the Survey pe-
riod,' so there were no legislative amendments to either the Texas
corporation statutes or the Texas Limited Liability Company Act.
There were only a few corporation law cases during the period that merit
attention, and the most important of these are grouped into the two gen-
eral categories of (1) shareholder, officer, and director liability and (2)
the interpretation and construction of corporate agreements. The most
significant developments in the limited liability company area involve In-
ternal Revenue Service rulings regarding entity classification for federal
income tax purposes.
* J.D., M.B.A., Southern Methodist University; C.P.A., Attorney at Law, Malouf
Lynch Jackson Kessler & Collins, Dallas, Texas. The author gratefully acknowledges the
helpful comments of William A. Bond, Esq. on a prior draft of this article.




A. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND
SHAREHOLDERS
1. Alter Ego Theory and Related Doctrines
The most troubling opinion of the year, Leitch v. Hornsby,2 was issued
by the San Antonio Court of Appeals on September 28, 1994. Grady
Hornsby was a cable television installer who injured his back while lifting
a reel of wire from a truck. Hornsby was apparently employed by two
corporations, Pro Coin Marketing Services, Inc. (Pro Coin) and Cable
Television Employment Services, Inc. (CTES), neither of which was a
worker's compensation insurance subscriber.3 As a result, no worker's
compensation coverage was available for the injury. Hornsby sued both
corporations as well as Russell Leitch and Hal Crews, the corporate pres-
idents and sole shareholders, in their individual capacities. Hornsby al-
leged, among other things, that the defendants negligently failed to
provide him with a safe workplace, adequate tools and safety training,
and competent co-workers to assist with his work. Although the jury did
not find that either corporation was the alter ego of its sole shareholder,
it found that the negligence of Pro Coin, Leitch, and Crews was a proxi-
mate cause of Hornsby's injury. The trial court entered judgment against
the three defendants, jointly and severally, for nearly $700,000 in dam-
ages and pre-judgment interest.
In affirming the judgment, the San Antonio Court of Appeals noted
that Leitch and Crews took an active part in the operations of the busi-
ness that employed Hornsby and wrote that "Leitch, Crews, and the cor-
poration each had a duty under tort law not to injure-actively or
passively."'4 The court reasoned that "[i]f there is individual negligence,
as the jury found in this case, it is not necessary to pierce the corporate
veil. Only where the individual's negligence is merely derivative of the
corporation's negligence is it necessary to pierce the corporate veil."'5
The court concluded that the officers "were held individually liable be-
cause they themselves committed negligence that proximately resulted in
an injury to Hornsby. Thus, Leitch and Crews are liable regardless of
whether alter ego was found."6
A more reasonable approach to the case appeared in the dissent by
Justice Peeples. He pointed out that although Leitch and Crews were co-
employees with Hornsby and not his employer, the majority's holding in-
2. 885 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ requested).
3. Although the opinion states that "... Leitch and Crews, each president and sole
shareholder of their respective corporations, both took an active role in managing the daily
operations of the business which employed Hornsby," it is unclear whether Hornsby was an
employee of CTES. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). The jury found that Hornsby was an
employee of Pro Com. Id. at 248.
4. Id. at 249.
5. Id. at 250.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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dicated that "individuals who work for a company owe as individuals the
same duty the company owes .... ,,7 While acknowledging that a corpo-
rate officer or employee can, in certain circumstances, be liable for his or
her own negligence, Peeples wrote that "this rule applies only when the
employee committed an independent tort-that is, owed an individual
duty to the injured person apart from the employer's duty and breached
that duty."'8 Peeples cited J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Moore,9 Maxey v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank,10 and Russell v. Edgewood Independent School Dist." as
well-settled authority for the proposition that "unless alter ego is estab-
lished, corporate agents and officers are personally liable for their actions
taken in the course of employment only when they breached a duty that
they owed as an individual to the injured person."'1 2 Considering the im-
pact that the majority's decision could have on officers, directors, and
shareholders of closely-held corporations, practitioners should hope that
the Texas Supreme Court will take the opportunity to correct this terrible
precedent from the San Antonio Court of Appeals.
In Western Horizontal Drilling v. Jonnet Energy Corp.,13 the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed whether the Texas Legislature's 1993 amendments to arti-
cle 2.21A(3) of the Texas Business Corporation Act' 4 eliminated the
applicability of the alter ego doctrine, in the context of breach of contract
claims, when corporate formalities have been disregarded. The case
arose in April, 1991, when Western sued Jonnet Energy Corp. (JEC) in
Texas state court to collect a debt of approximately $200,000. JEC re-
moved the case to federal district court. Western later joined the share-
holders of JEC, Elmer Jonnet and Joe Jonnet, as parties and attempted to
pierce JEC's corporate veil. In 1992, Western requested that Elmer and
Joe Jonnet admit that JEC was "merely a conduit for your personal fi-
nances and business transactions."' 5 The Jonnets never responded to the
requests for admission, thereby allowing them to be deemed admitted
pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Western
moved for summary judgment against both JEC and the Jonnets, based
on the alter ego theory. The Jonnets opposed the motion as to them-
selves, arguing that the admissions alone did not establish personal liabil-
ity under the alter ego theory. After summary judgment for Western was
granted, the Jonnets moved to amend the judgment on the grounds that
the legislative amendments to article 2.21A(3) had superseded the alter
ego theory. The court denied their motion.
On appeal, the Jonnets argued that because the 1993 amendments pro-
hibit contract claimants from relying on a failure to observe corporate
7. Id. at 251.
8. Id.
9. 449 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1970).
10. 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974).
11. 406 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. 885 S.W.2d at 252.
13. 11 F.3d 65 (5th Cir. 1994).
14. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 A(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
15. 11 F.3d at 66.
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formalities in order to pierce the corporate veil, the Texas legislature had
abolished the alter ego theory entirely. The Jonnets cited Pan Eastern
Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils16 for the proposition that nothing more is
required to establish an alter ego finding than "the failure of the owners
to maintain the corporation as a distinct legal entity,"'17 and asserted that
this description of the theory was precisely what was abolished by the
Texas legislature in 1993.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Jonnet's argument, writing that " 'a fail-
ure to observe any corporate formality' . . . is not synonymous with a
'failure of the owners to maintain the corporation as a distinct legal en-
tity.' ",18 The court stated that the legislative amendments are "clear and
unambiguous"' 9 in precluding the use of information relating to the fail-
ure to observe corporate formalities in proving the alter ego theory, and
held that the theory "applies when there is such unity between the corpo-
ration and individual that the separateness of the corporation has
ceased."'20 Because the court considered the Jonnet's deemed admissions
to be nearly identical to the description of the alter ego theory in Castle-
berry, the judgment in favor of Western was affirmed.21
2. Officer and Director Liability After Texas Franchise Tax
Delinquency
Jonnet v. State22 dealt with whether officers and directors can be held
personally liable for the obligations of a corporation which forfeited its
privileges because of a failure to pay franchise taxes but which never con-
ducted business after the forfeiture. This lengthy opinion from the Austin
Court of Appeals includes a concurrence by Justice Powers and a dissent
by Justice Jones, each asserting fundamentally different views of the
State's strongest incentive for the prompt payment of franchise taxes-
Texas Tax Code section 171.255(a).2 3
In December of 1985, Brent Ranch Operating, Inc. (BRO) acquired
several abandoned oil wells in Carson County, Texas and, pursuant to
16. 855 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1988).
17. Id. at 1132.
18. 11 F.3d at 69 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 69 n.5.
20. Id. at 69 (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986)).
21. Id. at 70.
22. 877 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
23. The statute provides that officers and directors are personally liable for each debt
that is created or incurred by a corporation after the date on which its franchise tax report
is due and before its corporate privileges are revived. The full text is as follows:
If the corporate privileges of a corporation are forfeited for the failure to file
a report or pay a tax or penalty, each director or officer of the corporation is
liable for each debt of the corporation that is created or incurred in this state
after the date on which the report, tax, or penalty is due and before the cor-
porate privileges are revived. The liability includes liability for tax or penalty
imposed by this chapter on the corporation that becomes due and payable
after the date of the forfeiture.
TEX. TAX CODE § 171.255(a) (Vernon 1992).
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Statewide Rule 14,24 had a statutory duty to plug the wells. In 1989, BRO
filed a franchise tax report which listed Elmer and Joe Jonnet as its of-
ficers and directors. 25 BRO failed to file its next franchise tax report,
which was due on March 15, 1990, and ultimately forfeited its charter in
December of that year. In December of 1989, BRO was warned by the
Railroad Commission that an action to compel compliance and assess
penalties would be forthcoming. BRO did not comply, and after a hear-
ing on the matter, the Commission issued an order dated December 3,
1990, assessing a penalty of $28,000 against the corporation.
BRO did not pay the penalty, so the State filed suit against BRO, El-
mer Jonnet, and Joe Jonnet. The State relied on section 171.255(a) in
asserting that Elmer and Joe Jonnet were personally liable for the obliga-
tion. The Jonnets claimed that they were not liable under section
171.255(a), because the penalty was not a debt "created or incurred" after
March 15, 1990, the date BRO's franchise tax report was due. Instead,
they argued that the penalty related back to BRO's initial violation of
Rule 14, which occurred in December of 1985. The district court ren-
dered judgment against BRO and the Jonnets, jointly and severally, for
$48,000 in penalties as well as attorney's fees and court costs.
On appeal, the Jonnets again argued that BRO's obligation related
back to the date that it first violated Rule 14, and cited several cases in
which debts based on the breach of a written instrument related back to
the date of the instrument. The court rejected the argument, pointing out
that BRO's liability was not based on an agreement between the parties
but arose because of the Railroad Commission's statutory authority
under the Texas Natural Resources Code.. The statute provides that the
Railroad Commission may assess penalties for rule violations, 26 and that
once a violation has been committed, each day the violation continues
may be considered a separate violation for penalty assessment purposes. 27
The court reasoned that each day that BRO's rule violations continued
constituted separate statutory violations, and that BRO's obligation was
created when the penalty was actually assessed by the Commission.28 Be-
cause the penalty was assessed on December 3, 1990, several months after
BRO's franchise tax delinquency, the court affirmed the Jonnets' per-
sonal liability for the obligation under Tax Code section 171.255(a).29
Justice Powers concurred in the decision but emphasized the impor-
tance of properly applying the relation-back doctrine and the rule of strict
construction when officers and directors are to be held personally liable
under Tax Code section 171.255(a). Powers analyzed several cases apply-
24. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14 (Vernon 1993). See also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 89.011 (Vernon Supp. 1995); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.012 (Vernon 1993).
25. It was a bad year for Elmer and Joe. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
26. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0531(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
27. Id. § 81.0531(b).




ing the doctrine and the rule30 and wrote that Texas courts have not "en-
grafted ... an appendage holding that officers and directors are never
personally liable whenever it may appear that a post-forfeiture debt, in
the sense of a legally enforceable, liquidated money obligation, has some
connection to a pre-forfeiture event, cause, or circumstance." '3 1
Justice Jones disagreed with the majority and, in a compelling dissent,
characterized the rationale for disregarding the corporate form and im-
posing personal liability on the Jonnets as nothing more than a "whim" 32
that was "contrary to the clear intent of the legislature. '33 Reviewing the
facts, Jones pointed out that BRO did not have any assets or conduct any
business after March 15, 1990, and that nothing in the record indicated
that the Jonnets had dealt improperly with BRO's assets before it ceased
doing business. Jones reasoned that an analysis of Tax Code section
171.255 as a whole, including the subsection that excuses officers and di-
rectors from liability for debts created or incurred without their knowl-
edge, leads to the inescapable conclusion that "when the legislature
decided to impose personal liability on directors and officers for corpo-
rate debts created or incurred after a failure to report or pay franchise
taxes, it did not have in mind post-forfeiture judgments or penalties
against defunct corporations that had not transacted any post-forfeiture
business whatsoever." 34 Jones further analyzed several of the cases cited
by Justice Powers and concluded that "there is only one reasonable inter-
pretation of the scope of personal liability imposed on directors and of-
ficers by section 171.255(a): the debt must have been created or incurred
by a post-forfeiture transaction of business by the corporation. '35
Serna v. State36 involved facts and issues similar to those presented in
Jonnet. Doer Energy Corporation (DEC) took control of a lease that
included four capped oil wells. Prior to the forfeiture of its corporate
privileges for the failure to pay franchise taxes, DEC uncapped and aban-
doned the wells. The State brought suit against DEC and two of its of-
ficers to compel compliance with Rule 14 and to assess administrative
penalties. The trial court rendered judgment against all three defendants,
30. See, e.g., Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d
79 (1946); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. State, 100 Tex. 420, 100 S.W. 766 (Tex. 1907);
McKinney v. Anderson, 734 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ);
River Oaks Shopping Ctr. v. Pagan, 712 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Curry Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Byrd, 683 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1984, no writ).
31. 877 S.W.2d at 527.
32. Id. at 538.
33. Id. at 530.
34. Id. at 533 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Silberstein, 398 S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. 1966)
and Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enter., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71, 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Justice Jones stated that Tax Code § 171.255 "was meant to
impose personal liability on officers and directors only for debts arising from a post-forfei-
ture transaction of business by a corporation." 877 S.W.2d at 532).
35. 877 S.W.2d at 535.
36. 877 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
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jointly and severally, for $21,000 in penalties, attorney's fees, and court
costs.
One officer appealed, claiming that after corporate privileges are for-
feited, an officer must take a specific action that creates a corporate debt
before that officer can be held personally liable for the debt. Following
the rationale of Jonnet,37 Justice Smith wrote that the relation-back doc-
trine applied only to contractual obligations and that the term "created or
incurred" in Tax Code section 171.255(a) was "broad enough to include
debts that have been 'brought on' by an act of omission. ' 38 Further,
Smith found that the requirement of section 171.255(a) that a debt be
created or incurred after the date on which a franchise report or tax is
due "refers to the timing of the liability rather than the timing of specific
actions of the corporate officers."' 39 In affirming the trial court's judg-
ment, Smith wrote that "[h]olding officers liable for failing to act on a
continuing obligation, after the forfeiture of corporate privileges, inflicts
a significant punishment on corporate officers for neglecting an obliga-
tion to protect the environment by plugging oil wells and strongly encour-
ages timely payment of franchise taxes."'40
B. CONSTRUcrION OF CORPORATE AGREEMENTS
1. Shareholder Agreement and Life Insurance Proceeds
In Little v. X-Pert Corporation4' the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether the corporation or the wife of a deceased former shareholder
was entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy held by the corpora-
tion under the terms of a shareholder agreement. About two years prior
to his death, James Little and three of his associates formed X-Pert Cor-
poration. They executed an agreement containing mutual covenants to
buy and sell a shareholder's interest either upon his death or if the share-
holder wished to make a sale of stock during his lifetime. In order to
fund a purchase of stock upon a shareholder's death, the agreement pro-
vided that the corporation would purchase life insurance policies on each
shareholder, pay the premiums, and be named as legal beneficiary. The
agreement further provided that "[i]n the event of the sale of a stock-
holder's interest during his or her lifetime, or upon the termination of this
buy-sell agreement for any reason, each respective insured stockholder
shall have the right to retain all contracts of insurance on his or her life
"42
In March of 1991, Little and his wife sold their stock to one of the other
shareholders. Little died approximately one month later. At the time of
his death, the corporation had a $250,000 life insurance policy in force on
37. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
38. 877 S.W.2d at 519.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 520.
41. 867 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. 1993).
42. Id. at 16.
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his life. The insurance company paid the insurance proceeds to the cor-
poration, and Little's widow demanded that the proceeds be paid to her.
X-Pert sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the insurance
proceeds and that its obligations under the shareholder agreement had
been performed. The trial court granted the corporation's summary judg-
ment motion, holding that the corporation was entitled to the insurance
proceeds, all accrued interest, and attorney's fees from Little's widow.43
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the intent
of the shareholder's agreement was to give James Little a right to the
insurance policy upon a sale of his stock, he had not exercised his right."4
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Mrs. Little argued that the share-
holder agreement established the relationship between her husband's es-
tate and the corporation, and that under the agreement, the corporation
had received the insurance proceeds on behalf of the estate. Further, she
claimed that the appellate court erred in adding an "unstated require-
ment ... that her husband have taken some affirmative step before his
death to claim the policy benefits. '45 The court agreed, concluding that
the language and the purposes of the shareholder agreement unambigu-
ously supported her claims.46 Importantly, the court stated that although
the language of the agreement might support the corporation's position if
viewed in isolation, the clause providing the right to acquire the insurance
did not "expressly require a selling shareholder to affirmatively elect to
receive the benefits of the life insurance policy."'47 The court found that
there was no reason why an election would be necessary because: (1) the
premiums had already been paid; (2) Little could obtain the policy for no
additional consideration; and (3) no selling shareholder "would ever elect
not to receive the ... insurance policy under the circumstances of this
case." 48 Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Hecht, Comyn, and Enoch
concurred in the judgment but felt that the agreement was ambiguous
and that the issue should have been remanded to the trial court for
resolution.49
2. Right of First Refusal on Corporate Subsidiary's Assets
In Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales Sys., Inc. 50
the Fifth Circuit considered whether the holder of a right of first refusal
on the stock and assets of a corporate subsidiary was entitled to exercise
the right when a third party agreed to purchase the stock of the parent
corporation. In 1984, Southeastern and Capital agreed that Capital
would have a preemptive right to purchase all the issued and outstanding
43. d
44. Id.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Il
47. Id.
48. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 18-19.
50. 30 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1994).
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shares of Waco Memorial Park, Inc. (Waco), a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Southeastern, or substantially all of Waco's operating assets. In 1993,
the Loewen Group (Loewen) made an offer to purchase all the shares of
Southeastern as well as all the assets that were owned by its shareholders
and used in the company's business. Capital notified Southeastern of its
intent to exercise its rights with respect to Waco and, when Southeastern
was unresponsive, filed suit in state court to enjoin the proposed transac-
tion. The defendants removed the suit to federal district court and filed a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
In the district court, Capital alleged that Southeastern had breached
the option agreement because Loewen's offer was for the purchase of the
"business of the Companies," 51 which included the Southeastern shares
as well as Waco's operating assets. Capital also claimed that Waco was
the alter ego of Southeastern; thus, an offer to purchase the stock or as-
sets of Southeastern constituted an offer to purchase the assets of Waco.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied Capital's mo-
tion for leave to amend its complaint.
In its de novo review and affirmance of the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit
found that Waco was an independent legal entity with its own assets and
liabilities; therefore, Southeastern never had the ability to directly trans-
fer Waco's assets to a third party.52 Further, the court found that because
the offer was only for the purchase of the parent corporation's stock, the
offer did not affect the ownership of Waco's assets or trigger the right of
first refusal.53 Regarding Capital's alter ego argument, the court affirmed
the district court's findings that piercing Waco's corporate veil would
have no effect because the option contract was binding only upon South-
eastern and no evidence indicated that Southeastern had been formed as
a fiction to avoid liability with respect to the option agreement. 54
C. AUTHORITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AFTER RECEIVERSHIP
A case of first impression in Texas, Chitex Communication, Inc. v.
Kramer55 presented the issue of whether the president of a corporation
under the control of a court-appointed receiver can file a voluntary bank-
ruptcy petition on behalf of the entity. The question arose out of divorce
proceedings between Daniel Donovan and Cathleen Kramer. In August,
1993, a divorce decree was issued along with a ruling that the stock of
Chitex Communication, Inc. was a marital asset. The decree appointed
Norman Fischer as receiver of the corporation, transferred ownership of
one-hundred percent of its shares to him, and divested Donovan and
Kramer of "all legal right, title and ownership of the stock of the Texas
51. Id. at 629.
52. 1d.
53. 1d.
54. 1d at 630.
55. 168 B.R. 587 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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corporation ... including all voting and other rights related thereto. '5 6
Further, the decree enjoined Donovan and Kramer from interfering in
any manner with Fischer's control over the assets, liabilities, and records
of the corporation. Donovan took no steps to appeal the decree.
In October of 1993, Donovan filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition for
Chitex in the purported belief that he had authority to do so as president
of, and attorney for, the company. He also sought a temporary re-
straining order and injunction to ensure that Fischer and Kramer would
not violate the company's rights under the bankruptcy code's automatic
stay provisions. Kramer apparently filed a motion to dismiss the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and, partly because of Donovan's failure to appear at
a hearing on the issue, the proceedings were dismissed with prejudice.
Donovan appealed the dismissal to the federal district court in Corpus
Christi on the grounds that the bankruptcy court had not acted in the best
interests of the debtor.
In affirming the dismissal, the district court noted that no Texas court
had addressed whether the president of a corporation in receivership can
file a petition for bankruptcy relief, on behalf of the entity, in federal
court. The district court found that although the divorce decree did not
explicitly remove Donovan as an officer or director of Chitex, "it is axio-
matic that a decree that vests 100% ownership and all rights of manage-
ment of a closely held corporation in a receiver constitutes a de facto
removal of Donovan from any position of authority. T57 Further, the
court found that "the authority of the officers of the corporation had
been entirely superseded by that of the court" 58 and that "[a]lthough the
receiver had no more authority or power than Donovan did before the
divorce decree, he did acquire Donovan's entire interest in Chitex." 59
III. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The nationwide trend toward recognition and acceptance of the limited
liability company (LLC) continued during the Survey period. As of No-
vember, 1994, only two states-Hawaii and Vermont-lacked an LLC
statute of one form or another. Practitioners have become increasingly
familiar with the flexibility and tax benefits that this form of entity can
offer,60 but there is some concern that the favorable treatment afforded
by the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) may eventually come
56. Id. at 588.
57. Id. at 589-90.
58. Id. at 590.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Robert R. Pluth, Jr., The Limited Liability Company: A New Alternative,
TRUSTS & ESTATES, Sept. 1994, at 14-17; Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection, ABA
JOURNAL, Sept. 1994, at 54-57.
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under congressional scrutiny if it. results in a significant revenue loss to
the United States government. 61
Although there were no significant judicial decisions or legislative
changes directly affecting Texas limited liability companies during the
Survey period, the Service published several rulings regarding the tax
treatment of LLCs organized under other state LLC statutes.62 In addi-
tion, the Service issued its first private letter ruling on whether LLC
members are subject to self-employment tax on their distributive shares
of the entity's income and loss. 63
As of the end of the Survey period,64 there was still no definitive gui-
dance on whether a one-member LLC will be treated as a partnership or
as an association taxable as a corporation for federal income tax pur-
poses.65 One private letter ruling was issued by the Service that high-
lights a potentially troublesome area for attorneys preparing LLC
organizational documents. In Private Letter Ruling 9433008, 66 an LLC
with only two members-one individual and his wholly-owned sub-
chapter S corporation-was found to be an association taxable as a cor-
poration rather than as a partnership. 67 The LLC's governing documents
provided that before a transferee could become a substituted member, all
61. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Apr. 15, 1994, at G-7 (summarizing comments by
a legislative aide to Senator David Pryor at an address to the D.C. Bar Section of Taxation
concerning the S Corporation Reform Act of 1993 (S. 1960)).
62. See Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-42 I.R.B. 11 (addressing LLCs organized under the
Oklahoma statute); Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-2 I.R.B. 21 (Louisiana); Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-3
I.R.B. 11 (Alabama); Rev. Rul. 94-30, 1994-19 I.R.B. 6 (Kansas); Rev. Rul. 94-51, 1994-32
I.R.B. 11 (New Jersey).
63. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9432018 (May 16, 1994) (ruling that LLC members who actively
participate in professional service business are subject to self-employment tax); see Meade
Emory et al., Service Says LLC Members Are Subject to SE Tax, 82 J. TAX'N 50, 50-51
(1995). The Service's position was greatly strengthened by the Treasury's issuance of Pro-
posed Regulation § 1.1402(a)-18. Although this regulation section was issued long after
the end of the current Survey period and is not covered in detail here, it essentially pro-
vides that a member's distributive share of LLC income is subject to self-employment tax
unless (i) the LLC could have been formed as a limited partnership in the same jurisdic-
tion, and (ii) the member could have qualified as a limited partner of that hypothetical
partnership. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18(a)-(c).
64. September 30, 1994.
65. On January 17, 1995, however, the Service issued Revenue Procedure 95-10, 1995-
3 I.R.B. 20, addressing when it will rule that a particular LLC is taxable as a partnership
rather than a corporation. Although the guidance was issued too late to be covered in
detail here, the message is clear that one-member LLCs will not be classified as partner-
ships for federal income tax purposes.
66. Priv. Ltr. Rul.. 9433008 (May 6, 1994).
67. U.S. Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2 sets forth six corporate characteristics to be
used in the determination of whether an association should be classified as an association
taxable as a corporation or as a partnership. These characteristics are (1) the existence of
associates, (2) the objective to carry on a business and to divide the gains therefrom, (3)
continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) limited liability of the interest own-
ers, and (6) free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1). The first two
characteristics, associates and an objective to carry on a business and divide the gains
therefrom, are common to all business associations and are disregarded in the determina-
tion. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2). An association will be taxable as a corporation if it exhibits
more than two of the remaining four corporate characteristics. See id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1);
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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the company's other members had to approve the transfer of the mem-
bership interest. Because the sole shareholder of the corporation was the
only other member of the LLC, the Service ruled that the restrictions on
transfer were not meaningful and that the entity possessed the corporate
characteristic of freely transferable interests. When that characteristic
was combined with the other corporate characteristics of limited liability
and centralized management, the Service concluded that the LLC was
taxable as a corporation rather than as a partnership. 68 This ruling em-
phasizes the need for caution and careful review which should be exer-
cised by practitioners structuring tax-advantaged entities for use by
business clients.
68. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9433008 (May 6, 1994).
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